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The European Commission Proposal for a Digital Services Act (DSA), released on
15 December 2020, is one of the cornerstones of the Commission’s ‘A Europe Fit for
the Digital Age’ political agenda. Alongside its sister, the Digital Markets Act (DMA),
the DSA is the main tool to regulate Big Tech platforms and to create a “safe and
accountable online environment.”
One of the salient questions in the DSA is who gets the decisive say in regulating
– exercising oversight and ensuring compliance – over “very large platforms” or
VLOPs. At EU-level, these decisions usually tend to oscillate between centralised
and decentralised approaches. The regulatory model proposed in the DSA is
highly centralised, with the Commission putting itself forward as the sole regulator
with teeth vis-à-vis VLOPs. This choice can be linked to enforcement failings by
some national regulators under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
but it might also create tensions with general requirements of independence and
impartiality of regulators. The proposed European Board for Digital Services (EBDS)
only has an advisory role vis-à-vis the Commission’s powers – implying that any
DSA-specific regulator, or decentralised power to member states’ authorities, is
excluded in the proposal. These issues will be unwrapped one by one.
Size matters
The DSA adopts a graduated approach to online platforms, with different rules
applying for different platform ‘sizes’. Only VLOPs will be subject to the full scope
of the proposed Regulation. VLOPs “provide their services to a number of average
monthly active recipients of the service in the Union equal to or higher than 45
million” (Article 25(1)). The number of 45 Million corresponds to 10% of EU citizens.
This covers more platforms than the “usual suspects” (those owned by e.g. Google
and Facebook), and that the proposal might seek to counteract the accusation that
the DSA is targeted at Big Tech only.
It is nevertheless noticeable that the DSA tables an adversarial approach to
regulating VLOPs, based on the assumption that these aren’t trustworthy. A
reasonable approach, given the numerous problematic Big Tech practices
that have been uncovered over the years. On this basis, the DSA proposes
sanctions for platforms for, among others, “[the] supply [of] incorrect or misleading
information” (Article 52(2)).
- 1 -
The Commission as the central regulator
Article 50 DSA grants the Commission generic regulatory powers to request
information, to conduct interviews and on-site investigations, to issue interim
measures, and to make commitments binding. Before initiating proceedings, the
Commission must only consult the European Board for Digital Services (EBDS,
Article 51). The EBDS’ purely advisory role indicates it will not really stand in the
Commission’s way.
The EDBS’s composition might be a source for concern. None of the existing
regulatory authorities are part of it sui generis, as is the case with the European
Data Protection Board (EDPB; previously Article 29 Working Party), which consists
of national DPAs. Note, however, that DPAs already existed at the time of GDPR’s
inception. The draft DSA proposes that national authorities get to squabble among
themselves about who gets to be the newly-introduced Digital Services Coordinator
(DSC), which should safeguard compliance with the DSA at national level. National
representatives of DSC’s participate in the EDBS. Already, there are open questions
on who might be designated DSC at national level, how they function in hierarchies
of and in relation to other national regulators, and whether they might fragment the
national regulatory landscape.
Integrating national DSCs in the EBDS allows the Commission to both maintain
and circumvent the so-called country of origin principle. This principle prevents
media laws of one member state to encroach on media laws of another: for example,
whenever a Spanish media provider providers services across Europe, they are
still regulated in Spain. The principle is deeply-enshrined in Digital Single Market
legislation. Its implementation in the GDPR, however, caused all complaints
regarding Big Tech platforms to go to the Irish DPA, given that Facebook, Google
and other VLOPs share Ireland as their EU country of origin. In effect, this DPA
has not only been overwhelmed and thus slow, but likely also struggles to respond
adequately to systemic financial and power asymmetries between Itself, the
Irish treasury and VLOPs. With its proposed regulatory position in the DSA, the
Commission can claim to be retaining the country-of-origin principle prima facie,
while still ensuring it is able to expeditiously conduct investigations, pass non-
compliance decisions and issue fines. This is likely a lesson drawn from the GDPR.
Meanwhile, consolidating regulatory powers against VLOPs within the Commission
may foster efficiency and speediness in oversight procedures – in cooperation with,
but uninterrupted by the EDPB – and might, given the potentially large impact of
such investigations, result in quick responses or actions to Commission notices of
non-compliance, or to fines imposed.
Size and impact of fines
The fines which the Commission can levy against VLOPs for infringements are
potentially huge – up to 6% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year
(Article 59 (1)). As sole regulator, the Commission holds potential for better VLOP
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compliance. Past experiences with the GDPR have shown that some national Data
Protection Authorities (DPAs) in member states where VLOPs have their point of
establishment were much less expeditious in passing (high) fines. For example, it
took the Irish DPA 8 years after the announcement of the GDPR in 2012 to issue its
first substantial fine.
In competition law, the Commission has comparable regulatory powers as in the
draft DSA. However, it remains to be seen whether she will impose significant fines
on VLOPs. So far, competition law fines have been relatively low, compared to the
percentage the Commission could have charged, and fines in this realm have not
pushed platforms into compliance. Likewise, GDPR fines imposed on platforms (and
other actors) have not done much to fundamentally change their behaviour. Why
would the fines under the DSA be any different?
Questions of independence and impartiality
In contrast to VLOPs, non-VLOP platforms are regulated by national DSCs. These
must perform oversight in an impartial, transparent, timely and independent manner
(Article 39 DSA). Where such smaller platforms are concerned, the DSA aligns
with the requirements of independence and impartiality – both supporting pillars of
the fundamental right of access to a court (Article 47 EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights). Independence and impartiality of regulatory oversight must be guaranteed a
priori, by national authorities (Article 39 DSA), given smaller platforms may often not
be able to afford expensive and lengthy legal proceedings to get justice done.
The Commission is no independent regulator. Potentially, the requirement of
independence and impartiality of the regulator may be different with VLOPS; they
can afford lengthy and expensive proceedings up until the European Court of
Justice. Indeed, fair proceedings do not require that every party must have had
access to an independent and impartial regulator in all phases of proceedings
(Crompton v United Kingdom). This approach is also reflected in EU competition law,
where tracking down and punishing those in breach has also been entrusted to the
Commission (Article 105 TFEU). In analogy with competition law, it could plausibly
be argued that in adopting ‘non-compliance decisions’ (Article 58 DSA), and in
imposing fines (Article 59 DSA), there is no need for an independent regulator. This
conclusion might be more appropriate for the Digital Markets Act, which more closely
resembles competition law.
In essence, the DSA closely relates to media and data protection law, where
impartial and independent regulators are the norm. Therefore, some have pleaded
for an independent, impartial DSA-specific regulator at EU level. This could perhaps
contribute to a unified EU-approach towards VLOPs’ content moderation practices,
and guide national DSCs towards more consistent policy. However, proposals
for new regulators are always controversial. How would a new regulator relate
to existing regulators and their powers at both EU level and national level? For
example, if such an independent regulator would develop new norms, how would
these be democratically legitimized? An independent regulator cannot be politically
interrogated. In other words, new players with new powers need robust justification.
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At the moment, it is not clear whether such justification exists – and it remains to be
seen whether a new regulator will be suggested in the negotiation process at all.
Final thoughts
The DSA is an ambitious proposal attempting to wholly reshape the regulation of
VLOPs. While the main themes of the proposal may seem straightforward, the devil
is always in the detail, and there will no doubt be sensitivity about who gets to exert
regulatory control over VLOPs at national and EU level. Ensuring independent
oversight and law enforcement vis-à-vis VLOPs might perhaps better align with
the GDPR and EU media law; however, a new EU-level regulatory institution with
powers from national parliaments’ perspective may not find fertile ground – for good
reasons. At face value, it is striking how much of the Commission’s proposal has
seemingly been inspired by the failings of the GDPR. It remains to be seen what of
its approach may withstand the negotiation processes and intense lobbying efforts.
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